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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to explore how the external balance of the United States (US) 
might evolve in future years as the economy emerges from the recession. We examine the 
issue from the domestic perspective of the saving and investment balance and from the 
external side in terms of the basic determinants of exports and imports and the role of the 
real exchange rate. Using these two respective perspectives, we highlight (1) causes and 
consequences of low private and public saving in the US, and (2) sensitivity of trade to 
variations in the real exchange rate. We highlight the need for sustained depreciation of the 
dollar to improve the competitiveness of US exports and argue that the current exchange 
rate is consistent with a significant reduction in the size of the trade deficit. 
However, the favorable external outlook is very inconsistent with a projected domestic 
situation of low rates of private saving and a very large public sector budget deficit matched 
by a cyclically depressed rate of investment. Changes in US corporate tax structure, 
reconsideration of capital controls, and perhaps some further decline in the level of real 
exchange rates could help soften the impact of a potentially very hard postrecession landing 
for the United States. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States (US) has had a substantial current account deficit since the mid-1990s. 
For most of that period, the deficit has increased steadily, reaching a peak in 2006 of 
US$800 billion, or 6.7% of national income. There has been widespread agreement that 
deficits of that magnitude could not be sustained; thus there exists a pervasive fear that the 
economy might be heading toward a hard landing—with an abrupt collapse of the dollar and 
severe economic disruptions both domestically and globally.  
In the fully employed economy of the mid-decade, the rebalancing of the US economy was 
viewed as a relatively straightforward, though politically difficult, two-pronged task. It would 
require (1) changing the composition of domestic demand away from an overemphasis on 
domestic consumption in order to free up resources for increased production in the tradable-
goods sector, and (2) expenditure-switching aimed at directing those resources into 
increased exports. The first goal was often described as a need to increase national saving, 
and the second as a change in the relative price of US-produced products to make them 
more competitive in world markets. 
For a brief period prior to the financial crisis, it appeared that a relatively benign adjustment 
might be under way. A real depreciation of the US dollar improved the competitiveness of 
American products, and the current account deficit gradually began to recede during 2007 
and the first three quarters of 2008. The improvement would have been even more marked 
were it not for the sharp increase in the price of petroleum imports. Export volumes grew by 
18% between the second quarter of 2006 and the second quarter of 2008, while import 
volumes were flat. The United States seemed to have begun a soft landing. 
However, there was little evidence of adjustment on the domestic side. The national saving 
rate continued to decline, turning negative in early 2008 due largely to sharply higher federal 
budget deficits. It was falling rates of investment, not increases in saving, that freed up 
domestic resources. The government responded to a weakening of residential investment 
with a temporary tax cut aimed at stimulating consumption, further widening the budget 
deficit and reducing saving. 
All this changed in the fall of 2008, with the onset of a global financial crisis centered in the 
United States. There has been a severe contraction of domestic demand and employment, 
and concerns about the composition of aggregate demand have largely vanished in the 
midst of extreme countercyclical policies aimed at stabilizing the economy. The external 
economy experienced an even larger collapse as global trade declined 25% below trend in 
the first half of 2009. US exports fell 20% below year earlier levels, with imports falling an 
even larger 28%. In 2009, the US current account deficit is estimated to have been only 
3.5% of national income―half its value in the peak year of 2006. Perversely, the US real 
exchange rate also soared at the onset of the crisis―temporarily reversing about half of the 
prior decline from its peak as investors sought a safe haven in US treasury securities. By the 
end of 2009, the dollar had reversed about half of the prior rise, and the real exchange rate 
had returned to its average of the early 1990s.  
What will be the future of external rebalancing and should it still be a major policy concern? 
The recession is ending, but most forecasts for the United States suggest a weak recovery 
with high levels of unemployment continuing for several years. Furthermore, distortions in 
the domestic saving and investment balance are far worse than before the crisis: The fiscal 
deficit has pushed the national saving rate highly negative, and the rate of net investment is 
a third that of the precrisis years. In the financial crises of other countries, recovery was 
largely driven by improvements in the trade balance (export-led growth). However, such a 
scenario may be difficult in a global recession in which most countries will see increased 
exports as a solution to their problems. Will the recovery of trade flows leave the United 
States with an imbalance comparable to that of the precrisis years?  
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The objective of this paper is to explore how the US economy and its external balance might 
progress in future years. In the next section, we review the evolution of the external 
imbalance over the past quarter-century―both from the domestic perspective of the saving 
and investment balance and from the external side, as reflected in the US current account 
imbalance and international investment position. The bulk of the paper then focuses on 
future challenges to external rebalancing from both the domestic and external perspectives. 
We examine the causes of low private saving in the United States and how it might evolve in 
the future. Second, we highlight the challenges faced by the public sector as the result of the 
aging of the population and continued rapid growth of health care costs. On the external 
side, we summarize the recent research on the determinants of trade flows and other 
elements of the current account. We focus particularly on the sensitivity of trade to variations 
in the real exchange rate and on concerns related to US export performance. Finally, we pull 
these strands together to consider the risks to a resumption of the soft landing that the crisis 
has arrested.  
2.  RETROSPECT 
Much of the debate and confusion surrounding the sources and consequences of the US 
imbalance in its economic relations with the rest of the world are due to the different 
perspectives from which the external imbalance can be analyzed. For example, the current 
account is defined as the difference between the incomes earned on exports and other 
transactions with the rest of the world and payments to foreigners for imports and other 
services.
1 The dominant role of exports and imports leads to a natural focus on the 
determinants of trade with other countries, such as exchange rates and the relative 
openness of markets. It also often leads to claims of “unfair” trade practices. From a 
domestic perspective, however, the current account is also the difference between the 
nation’s total income and its total expenditures; thus, a current account deficit can be said to 
be the result of the nation spending more than it earns, living beyond its means, and thereby 
borrowing from the rest of the world. The two perspectives are largely differing sides of the 
same phenomenon, varying perhaps in the initiating source of any change. It is useful to 
review the imbalance from both of these perspectives, recognizing the interactions and the 
importance of both sets of factors. Moreover, the issues are inherently global because of a 
third requirement that national imbalances must be offset on a global basis, so that the 
deficits of some countries are matched by surpluses of others. 
2.1  External Balance  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the US external balance over the past quarter-century. The 
balance of net resource flows as measured by the current account is shown in the top panel, 
and the cumulative net international investment (stock) position of the United States is 
shown in the lower panel. As the chart makes clear, there have been two episodes of large 
current account deficits: the early 1980s and the current episode, which emerged in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and has resulted in much larger and longer-lasting 
deficits. The top panel also shows the recent beginning of a correction after 2006, although it 
is exaggerated in 2009 by the effects of the economic crisis. The result of a quarter-century 
of current account deficits is the buildup of a highly negative international investment position 
that plummeted from a net creditor position in excess of 15% of national income in 1980 to a 
net indebtedness of 27% at the end of 2008. It is noteworthy, however, that the balance 
sheet has not deteriorated as much as would be expected on the basis of the large current 
account imbalances of the last decade. This is shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 by 
                                                  
1 The current account is the sum of three main kinds of external transactions: trade in goods and services, net 
factor income receipts, and net transfer receipts. Most discussions of external economic relations focus on 
trade flows because they are the largest component. 
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cumulating the current account deficits since 1980 and expressing the result as a share of 
national income. This indicator suggests that the US debt position would have been 
expected to exceed 50% of national income by 2008. The large difference between the two 
measures reflects the greater valuation gains on US investments abroad relative to those on 
foreign investments in the United States.
2  The role of capital gains is highlighted in 
Gourinchas and Rey (2007). In a previous paper, we also argued that some of the 
discrepancy can be traced to the shifting of reported income by multinational companies to 
avoid US taxation (Bosworth, Collins, and Chodorow-Reich 2007). 
While capital gains and losses are excluded in the official balance of payments accounts, 
they are included in the balance sheet measures.  
                                                  
2 For example, half of US investments abroad are allocated to direct investment and corporate equities, 
compared to only a quarter of foreign investments in the United States. 
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Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010) and authors' estimates 
The US imbalances are placed in a broader global context in Table 1, which provides a 
simple summary of the distribution of current account balances across major regions of the 
world for the period of 1980 to the present. Absent errors and omissions, the sum of the 
current accounts across all economies should equal zero. Thus, the deficits of some 
countries will be offset by surpluses of others.
3    
                                                  
3 Prior to the 1970s, current account imbalances were strictly limited because most national financial markets 
operated as closed systems. With the emergence of large-scale, cross-border capital flows, countries have 
become capable of financing increasingly large imbalances on a sustained basis. 
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Table 1: Current Account as a Share of World GDP, Selected Regions and Years 









2008  2009 
United States  -0.50  -0.43 -1.41 -1.37 -0.65 
Japan  0.26 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.17 
Europe
1  -0.01 0.09 0.23 0.15 -0.02 
Emerging Asia
2  -0.01 0.06 0.38 0.86 0.86 
Emerging Latin 
America
3 -0.11  -0.14  -0.02  0.04  -0.03 
Middle East
4 0.12  -0.04  0.21  0.51  0.11 
Other  countries  -0.31 -0.21 0.00 -0.11 -0.24 
Discrepancy 0.54  0.30  0.27  -0.41  -0.20 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2009. 
1. Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden. 
2. People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Republic 
of Korea; Taipei,China; and Thailand. First column average for 1982–1989. 
3. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
4. Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen. 
The table highlights the sharp dichotomy between the external position of the United States 
and everyone else. The United States consistently reports large deficits, which are matched 
by surpluses in most other regions of the globe. Europe’s surplus has declined since the 
mid-1990s; however, Japan’s surplus has remained basically unchanged for nearly a 
quarter-century. Similarly, little has changed in Latin America. Instead, the offsets to the 
increased US deficit are concentrated in the emerging economies of Asia and the oil-
producing states of the Middle East. Given the rise of oil prices, the surge of saving within 
the oil-producing regions is not a surprise, but the sudden emergence of a large excess of 
saving over investment in Asia was less expected. Finally, a large change in the statistical 
discrepancy over the past decade complicates the problem of relating the US deficit to 
surpluses in other specific regions. 
Trade in goods and services constitutes the largest component of the current account, and 
its balance is driven by rates of growth in foreign incomes (Yf) and domestic incomes (Yd), 
and the relative price of domestic versus foreign-produced goods (q): 
(1)   .  ) , , ( q Y Y f NX d f =
The concept of the real exchange rate provides a simple measure of relative prices, and it is 
defined as the nominal exchange rate (e) multiplied by the ratio of foreign and domestic 
prices (Pd/Pf):
4 
(2)   ( ) f d P P e q × = . 
Two alternative measures of the US real exchange rate are shown in Figure 2. Both are 
weighted averages of the exchange rates with major trading partners with weights based on 
bilateral trade flows, and an appreciation of the dollar is shown as a rise in the index.
5   
                                                  
4 We measure the exchange rate as the foreign price of domestic currency so that an appreciation of the 
currency is recorded as an increase in the exchange rate index. 
5 Market shares of US goods in foreign markets and foreign goods in US and third-country markets are used to 
construct the currency weights. The weights are updated on an annual basis in the FRB index, while those of 
JPMorgan change about once per decade. An advantage of the JPMorgan index is that comparable measures 
are provided for all the major trading economies. 
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The Federal Reserve reports a measure that uses consumer price indexes to adjust for 
differential rates of inflation, while JPMorgan publishes an index that is based on producer 
price indexes for manufacturing goods excluding food and fuels. The long-term movements 
in the two indexes are very similar, but the JPMorgan index indicates a slightly larger decline 
prior to the 2008 crisis and a sharper initial rise. Both indexes suggest that an adjustment 
was under way well before the crisis.  



















Sources: JPMorgan (2010) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2010)  
 
The real exchange rate also shows a very strong negative correlation with the current 
account balance reported in Figure 1. It seems evident that a currency appreciation is 
associated with a deteriorating current account balance. But it is also true that the exchange 
rate affects only trade flows with a substantial lag because it takes time for exporters and 
importers to adjust to their competitive positions. A simple means of summarizing the 
relationship is provided in Figure 3, which graphs the non-oil trade balance against a three-
year weighted average of the exchange rate.
6 While trade is affected by other factors, it 
seems very evident that after accounting for lags, the exchange rate plays a fundamental 
role. There is also evidence that the relationship has been shifting down over time. We 
explore these issues more fully in a later section. 
                                                  
6 The non-oil trade balance is measured as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and the exchange rate is 
a weighted average of the FRB index with weights of .25, .5, and .25 on the rates lagged one, two, and three 
years. The figure is based on an earlier presentation in Baily and Lawrence (2006). 
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Figure 3: Correlation of the Non-Oil Trade Balance  
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2010), and authors' 
calculations. 
The continuing deterioration of the US international investment position generated frequent 
forecasts of hard-landing scenarios based on a view that foreign investors would ultimately 
become unwilling to accumulate steadily rising shares of US assets in their portfolios. Many 
of those scenarios envisioned a “sudden stop” of capital inflows to the United States, leading 
to an uncontrolled fall in the value of the dollar and sharply higher US interest rates. 
Paradoxically, the crisis that emerged in 2008 seems more related to a surplus of capital 
inflows rather than any shortage, and the dollar surged in value with the onset of the crisis. 
Some of these observers now perceive the crisis to have been the result of an excessive 
willingness of foreigners to allocate funds to the US, which in turn contributed to a series of 
speculative bubbles in US asset markets. 
2.2  Internal Balance  
It is notable that for most of the past three decades a growing trade deficit has been 
associated with a buoyant domestic economy, rapid job growth, and a decline of 
unemployment to unprecedented levels. This domestic strength suggests that the trade 
deficit was not something forced on the US economy by outside pressures, but rather a 
response to changing domestic economic conditions that pushed aggregate demand beyond 
the nation’s productive capacity.
7 The excess demand was satisfied in a noninflationary way 
                                                  
7 If the deficit were the result of foreign production being unfairly dumped into the US economy, we would expect 
ongoing problems of excess unemployment and job shortages, something that was not evident prior to the 
financial crisis.  
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by exporting less and importing more. This was accomplished by an increase in foreign 
financial investments in the United States coming from a rise of saving relative to investment 
in other countries, a large growth of supply capacity in countries that export to the United 
States, and a stable or rising value of the dollar. The changing composition of aggregate 
demand, shown in Table 2, highlights the growing emphasis on private consumption as the 
secular counterpart to the growing trade deficit. Between 1980–1984 and 2000–2006, the 
share of GDP devoted to consumption rose by 5 percentage points, investment declined by 
0.5%, and the net trade deficit increased to 4.5% of GDP. However, the two episodes of 
marked reduction in the trade deficit—the late 1980s and the current period—are both 
notable for sharp cyclical reductions in domestic investment, not a scaling back of 
consumption. 
Table 2: Composition of US Aggregate Demand, 1980–2009 
Percentage of total                          












2007  2008 2009 
           
Consumption 80.4  82.2  83.1 82.0 84.8 85.4 86.7 87.7 
Private 63.4  65.2  66.7  67.3 69.6 69.7 70.1 70.8 
Government 17.0  16.9 16.4 14.7 15.2 15.7 16.5 17.0 
Investment 20.7  20.3  17.8 19.6 19.5 20.1 18.2 15.0 
Private 17.2  16.6  14.3  16.5 16.3 16.9 14.8 11.4 
Government 3.5 3.8  3.4 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6 
Net  Exports  -1.1  -2.5 -0.9 -1.7 -4.2 -5.5 -4.9 -2.8 
Total    100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (2010), and authors' calculations. 
A domestic perspective also emphasizes the relationship between the nation’s current 
account and its balance of domestic saving and investment. This follows directly from the 
basic national accounts identity that total domestic output (GDP) equals the sum of public 
and private consumption expenditures (C), investment (I), and exports (X), minus imports 
(M): 
(3)   , which can be rewritten as  M X I C GDP − + + =
(4)   I C GDP M X − − = − , 
    I S − = .    
That is to say, the trade balance is equal to saving minus investment. 
The situation is slightly more complex in practice because the residents of a country can 
earn income from overseas activity as well as from domestic production. Thus, the national 
accounts distinguish between gross domestic production (GDP) and gross national income 
(GNI), where GNI includes net earnings from abroad. In addition, net transfers are added to 
both sides of the identity. The result is a small redefinition of national saving: 
(5)   I NTR C GNI CA − + − = ) ) ( , or  
I S CA − = . 
Thus, the current account (external) imbalance is precisely matched by an (internal) 
imbalance between national saving and investment.  
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Finally, the US national accounts are structured to measure income, saving, and investment 
net of the depreciation of physical capital.
8 A summary of the US saving and investment 
balance is shown in Table 3 for the period of 1960–2009. For several decades prior to the 
mid-1980s, variations in the net national saving were largely driven by changes in 
government saving because the private saving rate was very stable and largely free of any 
trend. The simultaneous emergence of a large federal budget deficit and a current account 
deficit in the early 1980s, for example, gave rise to an emphasis on the “twin deficits.” The 
two were viewed as linked through the financial pressures of financing a large budget deficit 
leading to higher US interest rates, an appreciation of the exchange rate, and a trade deficit. 
However, the reemergence of a large current account deficit in the late 1990s, despite a 
rapidly improving fiscal situation, suggested that the notion of a special link between 
government budget deficits and the external balance was an overly simplistic interpretation. 
Instead, the gap between saving and investment in later years can be traced to a large drop 
in the private saving rate—due in turn to sharply lower rates of household saving—and 
strong investment demand. The boom in information technology during the 1990s made the 
United States a particularly attractive location for business investment, and a strong 
expansion of residential investment also contributed to the growing domestic imbalance. The 
magnitude of the decline in household saving remains something of a puzzle, despite 
extensive research; some of the potential reasons are discussed more fully in a following 
section. 
Table 3: United States Net Saving and Investment by Sector, 1960–2009 
Percent of national 









2007  2008 2009 
         
Saving 10.9  6.5  5.4  3.6  -0.2  -2.9 
Private  10.9  10.0  6.9 5.3 5.3 7.2 
Household  7.0 7.2 4.6 2.2 2.3 3.8 
Corporate  3.9 2.9 2.3 3.1 3.0 3.4 
Government  0.0 -3.6 -2.4 -1.7 -5.4  -10.1 
        
Domestic investment  11.1  9.4 7.9 8.4 6.2 2.3 
Private  9.0 7.8 6.7 7.1 4.7 0.7 
Government  2.1 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 
        
Saving-Investment  -0.2 -2.9 -2.5 -4.8 -6.4 -5.2 
        
Current  account  0.4 -1.8 -1.7 -5.5 -5.6 -3.5 
        
Statistical discrepancy   0.7 1.1 0.8 -0.7 0.8 1.7 
        
Capital  consumption 11.8 14.1 13.3 13.7 14.6 15.2 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts (2010), and authors’ calculations. 
Notes: Net income, saving, and investment exclude capital consumption allowances. The statistical discrepancy is 
equal to investment plus the current account minus saving. 
The economic crisis has brought on another major realignment with household saving 
showing a modest increase, but investment demand has collapsed. Moreover, government 
budget deficits have reemerged during the current decade as a significant source of the low 
                                                  
8 The emphasis on net measures of saving and investment is also common for other advanced economies; but 
many developing economies do not undertake detailed estimates of capital depreciation, and they present 
estimates of saving and investment on a gross basis. 
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national saving rate, and extraordinary fiscal actions in 2008–2009 turned the national 
saving rate negative. 
Finally, the national accounts include a significant statistical discrepancy that at times has 
made it difficult to fully reconcile short-run changes in the current account with the domestic 
S-I balance. For example, there is much less evidence of an improvement in the S-I balance 
after 2006 than is observed in the reported current account. Instead, the statistical 
discrepancy changed from a large negative residual in 2005–2006 to a positive value for 
2008–2009.  
3.  WHY DON’T AMERICANS SAVE? 
A correction in the external imbalance will require both an increase in private and 
government saving, but the decline in private saving has been particularly dramatic. Private 
saving consists of the saving of households and corporate retained earnings, but the entire 
secular decline is within the household sector (Table 3). The household (personal) saving 
rate fell from an average of 7% of national income in the early 1980s to approximately 2% in 
the middle of the last decade. 
The fall in household saving has been most puzzling because the movement of the baby 
boom generation into the ages of peak retirement saving was expected to cause a rise in the 
total saving rate. The second surprise has been a large rise in the wealth-income ratio in the 
face of the declining rates of saving. In other words, if Americans save so little, why are they 
so rich? One consequence has been a shift away from a focus on demographic explanations 
for saving behavior to a greater emphasis on the role of wealth in influencing consumption 
decisions. 
The conventional measure of saving excludes all forms of capital gains, yet many 
economists have argued that wealth changes are a far better measure of changes in 
economic well-being than rates of saving alone. Some of the most cited references are 
Auerbach (1985), Hendershott and Peek (1989), Bradford (1991), Eisner (1991), Gale and 
Sabelhaus (1999), and Peach and Steindel (2000). 
Indeed, at the individual level there is much to be said for focusing on wealth accumulation 
rather than saving. By enabling greater future consumption, wealth is an important element 
of economic well-being, and it matters little how the individual accumulated it. Thus, at the 
level of individual households, economists often focus on wealth as the best indicator of 
preparedness for retirement. 
At the aggregate level, however, the issues are more complex. The measure of saving is 
part of a system of national accounts aimed at reporting the level of current production and 
its allocation among alternative uses and recipients. Those flow accounts can be embedded 
in a more complete framework of wealth accumulation that makes a sharp distinction 
between saving and valuation changes. That is, the change in wealth is equal to saving plus 
the revaluation of existing wealth: 
(6)   S W P
P W W t
t
t








1 , where 
Wt is equal to wealth at time t, and ΔPt/Pt-1 is the average revaluation of the wealth 
components due to asset price changes. There are, however, limited advantages to 
introducing valuation changes directly into the national accounts. The inclusion of valuation 
changes would reduce the usefulness of the accounts in measuring changes in production; 
and while most economists would agree that wealth and income are both important 
determinants of consumption, few would argue that the marginal propensity to spend out of 
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wealth is anywhere near that for changes in income.
9 It seems preferable to maintain the 
existing framework, but to include wealth and its changes as a major determinant of saving. 
From this perspective, it appears that the strong capital gains in equities and home 
ownership over the past two decades may have played an important role in stimulating 
consumption. Figure 4 shows the pattern of change in the household wealth–income ratio 
since 1980 and separates the contribution of saving to wealth accumulation from that of 
valuation changes. Prior to the mid-1990s, valuation changes were a minor source of wealth 
gain because most asset prices simply rose in line with the overall rate of price inflation, and 
household wealth varied within a narrow range of 4–5 times disposable income. More 
recently, increases in the relative prices of housing and equities raised the wealth-income 
ratio to 6 times income in 1999 and 2004–2007. In contrast, the contribution of saving began 
to decline in the 1990s; and by 2007, the wealth-income ratio exclusive of capital gains had 
fallen to 3.5, compared with a pre-1995 average of 4.5. Thus, it is evident that reduced 
saving has slowed the rate of wealth accumulation, but valuation changes have played a 
greatly increased role. 
Figure 4: Household Wealth as a Ratio to Income, 1970–2008 





























Sources: Computed from tables B100 and R100 of the Flow of Funds Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
National Income and Product Accounts (2010). Net investment flows are converted to real values, cumulated, and 
converted back to nominal values. Wealth includes consumer durables. 
In the typical empirical formulations of the life-cycle model of consumption, researchers 
estimate a long-run effect of a change in wealth on consumption of about 0.05. Poterba 
(2000) provides a review of previous articles. More recent macroeconomic studies are those 
of Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) and Belsky and Prakken (2004). 
That magnitude would suggest that an increase in the wealth-income ratio from 4.75 times 
income in the 1980s to about 6 times in 2000–2007 contributed to a rise in the share of 
                                                  
9 In addition, not all wealth changes will have the same aggregate effects. For example, increases in home 
values are seen as a gain to current homeowners, but in the aggregate they are largely reflective of an 
intergenerational transfer as younger families pay higher prices to older homeowners to purchase the same 
flow of housing services. 
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consumption in disposable income of 5–7 percentage points—a large proportion of the 
observed decline in the saving rate since the early 1980s. However, there is a wide variation 
in the empirical results, and some studies maintain that the effects differ among the various 
categories of wealth, such as equities and housing.
10 It is even more difficult to distinguish a 
causal relationship from the fact that consumption and asset valuations are influenced by 
many common factors. Finally, it is notable that a significant portion of the decline in saving 
preceded the surge in wealth valuations that began in the mid-1990s.  
A variety of other factors have also been put forth to explain the collapse of saving. For 
example, some researchers would redefine saving to include consumer durables, make 
adjustments to offset the effects of inflation, or propose differing treatments of retirement 
accounts. However, as emphasized by Reinsdorf (2007), none of the adjustments changes 
the fundamental conclusion of a large secular decline in the saving rate. More importantly, 
the alternatives provide little reason to anticipate a future turnaround.  
The research on household saving behavior has left us with a great deal of uncertainty about 
future trends. The link in the life-cycle model between saving and desired wealth 
accumulation would suggest that saving will rise in future years because the forces that have 
sustained wealth accumulation in the face of depressed saving cannot continue indefinitely. 
As we have learned from the current crisis, neither equity nor housing prices are likely to 
outrun the growth of nominal incomes and substitute for saving to the extent of that they 
have over the past two decades. The magnitude of the asset losses during the financial 
crisis should accelerate that process. However, other explanations that emphasize 
demographic factors, the growth of the public pension system as a substitute for private 
retirement saving, and behavioral factors would point to a more permanent shift toward a low 
rate of household saving. We conclude that any reversal of the private saving rate is likely to 
be modest in the near future and that a full recovery of national saving to its historical norm 
near 10% of national income will require a substantial change in the fiscal condition of the 
public sector. 
4.  PUBLIC SECTOR FISCAL BALANCE 
As mentioned earlier, there is no longer much support for the “twin deficits” notion of a direct 
one-for-one link between budget deficits and the current account. Government saving and 
investment, however, are still important components of the overall accounting identity linking 
national saving, investment, and the current account; and rejection of the twin deficits view 
does not imply that variations in the fiscal balance have no implications for the current 
account. Yet because the components are all endogenous with common determinants, it is 
difficult to measure the effect of an exogenous shift in the fiscal balance with any degree of 
precision.
11   
Slightly less than half of government spending (45%) is undertaken by state and local 
governments, and about 20% of their revenues are in the form of federal transfers. They are 
constrained to maintain relatively balanced budgets by constitutional requirements and fears 
of migration to other tax jurisdictions. In the aggregate, their fiscal deficits have averaged 
less than 0.5% of national income, although their combined deficit was slightly above 1% in 
2009. Thus, nearly all discussions of the US fiscal policy focus on the federal government 
budget. 
                                                  
10 The effect of variations in housing wealth on consumption is particularly controversial. Buiter (2008) and Sinai 
and Souleles (2005) have argued that home ownership is largely a hedge against future rent costs; and to the 
extent that the home value is equal to the present value of future consumption of housing services, fluctuations 
in home prices should imply no net aggregate wealth gain. 
11 Some recent empirical efforts to measure the net relationship between the two components suggest that 30–
40% of a change in the fiscal balance will be reflected in the current account (Bartolini and Lahiri 2006). The 
remainder is absorbed by offsetting changes in the private saving-investment balance.  
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Some researchers have interpreted the finding of a limited link between the fiscal and 
external balance to imply that deficit reduction cannot play a critical role in reducing the 
external imbalance. Perhaps that was true a few years ago when the projected fiscal deficit 
was a relatively modest percent of GDP. However, as shown in Figure 5, the financial crisis 
and the measures taken to reverse it have dramatically altered the fiscal outlook of the 
United States. The federal deficit was 10% of GDP in fiscal year 2009, and is projected at a 
similar level in 2010. Those deficits are sufficient to turn the net national saving rate negative 
for 2009 and 2010. As shown in the figure, they also represent an enormous shift in the 
budget outlook compared with the projections that accompanied the FY2008 budget. The 
baseline projections of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) assume that all of the 
stimulus measures are allowed to expire and that the tax reductions of the Bush 
administration are reversed. They are a best-case scenario, yet the projected deficits still 
remain above 3% of GDP in future years. The Obama administration has proposed an 
alternative in which the deficit is 11% of GDP in fiscal year 2010 and declines to 4% over the 
next 5 years.
12 Even with the CBO baseline assumption, the public debt will rise to 65% of 
GDP in the next 3 years—double the level expected in the 2008 budget—and slowly rise 
thereafter. Under the alternative projection of the administration, the debt will be about 77% 
of GDP at the end of the 10-year projection period. 
A perspective that highlights the conflict between a rising share of GDP being devoted to 
federal government expenditures and a stable or falling revenue share is provided in Figure 
6. For several decades, federal expenditures were a constant share of GDP as declining 
defense spending offset steadily rising outlays on medical and income transfers to the 
elderly. That pattern has been interrupted by the rising cost of wars in the Middle East. In 
future years, the total will rise at an accelerating rate due to increased costs for a retiring 
baby-boom generation and interest on the public debt. Meanwhile, government revenues 
remain at or below their historical share of GDP due to tax reductions that were enacted as 
part of the 2009 fiscal stimulus. 
There is, however, no political support at the current time for either a scaling back of 
programs for the aged or tax increases. The Obama administration has committed to a 
PAYGO rule of paying for new future programs with offsetting budget actions, but it has 
exempted many of the items in the previous budget projections. And in the short run, 
reductions in the budget deficit conflict with an urgent need to reduce unemployment. 
5.  WHY IS THE US TRADE DEFICIT SO PERSISTENT? 
We have already documented the persistently large US external deficits over the past 
quarter-century, and in particular from the early 1990s through the mid-2000s, during which 
the deficit increased steadily to more than 6% of GDP. We have also argued that a gradual 
tapering of this deficit began in 2006—associated with a substantial real depreciation of the 
US dollar (and expenditure switching), but with little evidence of the internal rebalancing 
(expenditure reductions) also required for a sustainable transition to lower imbalances. While 
the onset of the economic crisis, with its sharp dollar appreciation, arrested the fledgling “soft 
landing,” the collapse in world trade cut the US trade deficit in half 2009.  
In this section, we take a closer look at net exports, the main component of the current 
account. After briefly describing the evolution of US exports and imports, we turn to a review 
of their determinants and the implications for what might be required for a sustained 
rebalancing from this “external” perspective. Also of interest is recent work examining 
experiences with current account reversals and with recovery from crises in advanced 
economies that may be quite relevant for the United States.  
                                                  
12 The alternative assumes that the Congress will extend the bulk of the Bush Administration tax cuts and adjust 
the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for inflation. The Congress has also acted every year to prevent the 
implementation of a law reducing Medicare reimbursements. 
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Figure 7 shows the evolution of exports and (total as well as non-oil) imports as a 
percentage of GDP since 1980. While the United States did become somewhat more open 
during this quarter-century, it is notable that most of this increase is associated with import 
growth in the second half of the period. In 2005, exports were about the same share of 
output as they were in 1980. The figure also shows the two episodes of large imbalances. In 
the mid-1980s, the trade deficit was primarily due to a deterioration in exports generated by 
the expansive fiscal policy of the Reagan years, high interest rates, and a sharp appreciation 
of the US exchange rate. In the more prolonged second episode, the issues have been 
steadily rising imports combined with weak export performance. The figure also shows the 
faster growth in exports over imports narrowing the deficit in 2006–2007, as well as the more 
recent sharp drop in exports and the even more pronounced fall in imports. 
5.1  Determinants of the US External Balance  
A large body of empirical literature studies the determinants of US imports and exports, 
typically estimating the sensitivity of exports and imports to changes in (lagged) relative 
prices and incomes. During the past decade, there has been a focus on examining what it 
would take to achieve a sustained reversal of the US current account deficits. However, 
there has been considerable variation in time period, specification, and measurement of key 
variables, resulting in a wide range of estimates.  
Until relatively recently, the empirical results tended to support what became known as 
“elasticity pessimism.”
13 There are two reasons for this pessimism. First, US imports were 
found to be quite insensitive to changes in relative prices. While exports seemed to be 
somewhat more price-elastic, studies often found the overall price elasticities low enough 
that a depreciation of the dollar would be associated with trade balance improvement only 
because of the relatively low pass-through of nominal exchange rates into import prices. 
Conventional wisdom suggested that to accomplish a 1 percentage point of GDP decline in 
the US external deficit would require a relatively large real depreciation of the dollar―by as 
much as 10% to 20%.  
Second, the estimates tended to support a finding by Houthakker and Magee (1969) that US 
imports are considerably more sensitive to increases in US income than are US exports to 
increases in the income of US trading partners. Thus, balanced growth in the US and its 
trading partners would be associated with a deteriorating US external balance.  
More recent work benefits from improvements in specification and inclusion of data since 
2000. In particular, researchers have explored issues related to vertical integration and trade 
in intermediates, as well as aggregation bias and the possibility that shifts in the composition 
of trade away from goods and toward services may have increased price and income 
responsiveness. While there is no clear consensus on the magnitude of the relevant 
elasticities, studies that use the same methodology to compare the past decade with prior 
periods tend to find that both exports and imports have indeed become more responsive to 
changes in both incomes and relative prices, and furthermore, that the Houthakker-Magee 
asymmetry in income elasticities has disappeared. Thus, a 1 percentage point reduction in 
the aggregate trade deficit may now be associated with a smaller real dollar depreciation, 
perhaps in the range of 8% to 15%, and balanced growth need not imply trade balance 
deterioration (See International Monetary Fund [2007]; Crane, Crowley, and Quayyum 
[2007]). 
                                                  
13 Examples include Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000) and Chinn (2004). Unlike the 
earliest studies, these authors incorporate the more recent estimation techniques that allow 
for feedback among key variables and address nonstationarity in the trade data. The IMF 
(2007) provides a summary of the relevant literature, as well as new estimates of the 
relevant elasticities and an interesting review of 42 episodes since 1960, in which advanced 
countries achieved reversals of large sustained external deficits.     
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In Table 4, we provide some empirical estimates of US trade elasticities that illustrate the 
issues discussed previously. The first panel reports a simple logarithm regression that 
relates the real value of US exports to global GDP, a 4-year average of the real exchange 
rate, and a time trend. We also distinguish between exports of goods and services. In the 
middle panel, we report similar equations for imports, but use US real GDP as the activity 
variable. The third panel focuses on the net trade balance, but because it is frequently 
negative, we measure the balance as the logarithm of the ratio of exports to imports. If trade 
is balanced, the ratio is unity. This specification constrains the coefficients on the two activity 
variables to be equal.
14 
 
14 The trade data are from the US national accounts. The contribution of the real exchange rate is maximized with 




   Exports    Imports    Trade Balance 
   Total  Goods  Services    Total 
Goods 
(less 
petrol)  Services   Total 
Goods 
(less 
petrol)  Services 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
                   
Average Federal Reserve 
Board (FRB) Exchange Rate   -0.69***  -0.76***  -0.57***    0.65**  0.73** 0.43*    -1.43***  -1.52***  -1.24*** 
   (0.15)  (0.19)  (0.16)    (0.19)  (0.26)  (0.17)    (0.20)  (0.29)  (0.14) 
                        
Time Trend    -0.022  -0.035  0.007  0.006  0.007 0.002    -0.016** -0.026***  0.006*** 
   (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
                        
Log (World GDP)    2.68***  3.17***  1.64**                 
   (0.50)  (0.65)  (0.55)                 
                        
Log (US GDP)            2.35***  2.65***  1.59***         
           (0.40)  (0.54)  (0.38)         
                   
Log (World GDP/US GDP)                    2.00**  2.72**  0.22 
              (0.59)  (0.86)  (0.52) 
                   
Constant   -17.02**  -21.81**  -8.81    -17.83*** -21.32*** -11.27**  4.70**  4.49*  5.46*** 
   (4.89)  (6.42)  (5.43)    (3.30)  (4.42)  (3.09)    (1.32)  (1.94)  (1.04) 
                        
Observations   33  33  33    33  33  33    33  33  33 
Adj. R-squared    0.99  0.98  0.99   0.99  0.97  0.99    0.85  0.76  0.78 
RootMSE   0.027  0.035  0.029    0.036 0.049 0.034    0.034  0.05 0.035 
Rho    0.770 0.822 0.758  0.786 0.855 0.457  0.911 0.906  0.818 
g Paper 236    Bosworth and Collins 
Notes and sources: Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. US GDP, world GDP, exports, and imports are in real terms. Imports exclude 
petroleum. Average FRB Exchange Rate is the log of a 4-year average of the Federal Reserve Board’s (FRB’s) broad real exchange rate index. The regressions have been 
corrected for autocorrelation using the Prais-Winsten methodology and the autocorrelation transformation is indicated by the rho. 
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We highlight three features of the regression results. First, we also find that the Houthakker-
Magee asymmetry has disappeared, with the income elasticities of exports and imports both 
estimated to be about 2. Because the US and the world economies grew at roughly equal 
rates over the past two decades while the world economy grew significantly faster than the 
US since 2000, income effects cannot account for the deterioration in the US trade 
imbalance. Second, exports and imports have similar price elasticity magnitudes. 
Furthermore, their sum is well above 1, implying that exchange rate depreciation will have a 
net positive effect on the trade balance.  
Third, we find a significant negative trend in the equation for the total trade balance. As 
shown, this negative trend reflects a secular decline in exports relative to imports of goods. 
In contrast, the trend is positive for the services trade, which accounts for a relatively small 
share of the total. We tested the hypothesis of a one-time shift in the constant term―as 
shown in Figure 3―for a range of possible “shift dates.” However, the gradual trend 
deterioration we report here was clearly preferred to a shift. We note that the trend is larger 
in the export than the import equations, but not statistically significant. The finding of a 
gradual deterioration in US exports relative to imports, when controlling for relative prices 
and incomes, is quite provocative. We discuss some aspects of the issue in the following 
section, but a full exploration of the factors underlying this result is an interesting area for 
future work. 
6.  CAN US EXPORTS COMPETE?  
Baily and Lawrence (2006) identify weak US export performance as the primary explanation 
for the secular decline in the trade balance. Similarly, our previous work argued that the 
United States underperforms as an exporter of goods relative to a peer group of high-income 
European countries and Japan (Bosworth and Collins [2008]). Our analysis was based on a 
standard “gravity equation” formulation that relates bilateral import and export flows to 
economic size, distance, and other measures believed to be associated with degree of 
“trade resistance” such as common language and existence of colonial ties. We pooled the 
data for the bilateral trade for three regions (the original 15 members of the European Union 
(EU), Japan, and the United Sates) with 162 other countries for the period of 1980 to 2005. 
We also included the real exchange rate for each of the three regions as a measure of 
relative price competitiveness. Those regressions are reproduced in Table 5. A “dummy 
variable” for the United States in the combined export equation is consistently negative and 
significant. In contrast, we find no evidence that the United States performs differently than 
Japan or the EU in terms of imports.   
17 ADBI Working Paper 236    Bosworth and Collins 
 














   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Weighted Distance  -1.102  -1.098  -1.123   -1.02  -1.02  -1.007 
 (-61.2)  (-62.6)  (-63.4)   (-39.7)  (-39.7)  (-38.6) 
Population 0.831  0.837  0.838  0.976  0.976  0.975 
 (172.3)  (178.0)  (178.8)    (139.5)  (139.4)  (139.4) 
GDP per Capita  0.973  0.974  0.972    1.062  1.062  1.063 
 (153.1)  (157.4)  (157.5)    (116.6)  (116.6)  (116.6) 
Common  Language 0.258 0.529 0.544    0.562 0.562 0.554 
 (10.9)  (20.7)  (21.3)    (16.7)  (15.0)  (14.7) 
Colony 0.556  0.156  0.326    0.698  0.699  0.61 
 (21.9)  (5.2)  (9.2)    (19.3)  (16.0)  (11.6) 
East Asia Region  0.4  0.407  0.414    0.755  0.755  0.751 
 (15.1)  (15.8)  (16.1)    (19.9)  (19.9)  (19.8) 
United States    -0.586  -0.609      0  0.012 
   (-24.2)  (-25.1)      (0.0)  (0.3) 
Log Average 
Exchange Rate*      -1.119        0.586 
     (-8.7)        (3.1) 
Constant -34.325  -34.249  -28.94  -38.49  -38.49  -41.276 
 (-170.8)  (-175.1)  (-45.1)   (-133.9)  (-133.8)  (-43.6) 
adj_R2 0.84  0.848  0.849    0.762  0.762  0.762 
Observations 10570  10570  10570  10433 10433 10433 
Sources: Estimated by authors as described in text. All the regressions are estimated within a fixed effects model 
allowing for shifts over years. All variables are measured as logarithms except for the categorical variables of 
common language, colony, the United States, and the East Asia region.  
*Computed as the trade-weighted real exchange rates of the United States, Japan, and the EU-15, averaged over the 
prior 5 years. Data provided by JPMorgan. 
Why has US export performance been so weak? This does not appear to be attributable to 
either a lack of growth in US export markets or to the commodity composition of trade. A 
partial explanation may relate to the willingness of American multinational firms to use the 
local production of foreign affiliates as an alternative to exporting. US affiliates of foreign 
parents purchased 16.4% of their sales abroad in 2007, as reflected in US imports for goods 
and services. In contrast, foreign affiliates of US parents purchased just 6.2% of their total 
sales directly from the United States. If this share were increased to 16.4%, US exports 
would rise by more than US$600 billion, or more than one-third of their 2007 value.
15 
Second, foreign observers often point to US government restrictions on high technology 
exports, but the magnitude of potential trade covered by those measures is relatively small. 
While this is an area that would benefit from additional analysis, it is important not to 
exaggerate the concerns with export performance. Baily and Lawrence (2006) stress that 
only a quarter of the increased deficit between 1991 and 2005 can be attributed to the shift 
they uncover, with fully three-quarters associated with the much stronger value of the US 
dollar.  
6.1  Impact of the Crisis 
While trade flows typically fall during global downturns, the drop during the current crisis has 
been considerably more severe than historical evidence would have predicted. In partial 
                                                  
15 These data come from Lowe (2010). However, in our earlier work, we found little difference between US and 
Japanese affiliates’ activities in the PRC. Thus, we remain uncertain about the full implications of US affiliates’ 
behavior. 
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explanation, Freund (2009) presents evidence that the sensitivity of world trade to global 
GDP has increased every decade since the 1960s, and that the cumulated rise in this 
income elasticity is large and significant. Furthermore, the sensitivity tends to rise in the 
midst of a recession. She also finds banking crises to be associated with somewhat larger 
import declines, supporting the hypothesis that the financial crisis may be partially to blame 
for the speed and extent of trade collapse.  
Other hypotheses have been advanced to explain the magnitude of the recent collapse in 
trade. One focuses on the implications of increased specialization in the global supply chain. 
Another notes that goods production tends to fall more sharply than services production 
during a downturn. Goods are a larger share of trade than of GDP, and the share of services 
in global output has been growing. While each of these factors seems likely to have played a 
role, it is too soon for a full analysis that might suggest their relative importance. 
Unlike unemployment, trade flows tend to rebound relatively quickly as output growth 
recovers in the aftermath of a crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff [2008, 2009]; Freund [2009]). 
Indeed, Freund (2009) finds that most of the trade adjustment occurs in a year. Thus the 
moderation of large imbalances seen in the midst of the downturn is typically short-lived. She 
also finds that, on average, there is no lasting rebalancing for either of those countries in 
deficit or those in surplus precrisis. Cases in which the crisis triggered a significant change in 
investment or fiscal policy are offset by those in which the imbalance deteriorated further 
postcrisis. However she, like other researchers, cautions against drawing too close parallels 
between the current crisis and past episodes. The recent collapse was much more pervasive 
and severe, and it originated in the core, not in smaller, more peripheral economies.
16 
7.  POSTCRISIS OUTLOOK 
The financial crisis has had a major impact on the United States economy. The 
unemployment rate has been driven above 10%, compared with 4.6% in 2006–2007. The 
collapse of the housing market has left millions of homeowners with a negative equity 
position, and the market for corporate equities remains far below the precrisis level, creating 
severe problems for the private pension system. The financial system remains damaged, 
and difficulties of obtaining credit are expected to slow the pace of economic recovery. As 
discussed previously, the crisis and the government’s response have also left the United 
States with a severely distorted saving-investment balance. While the external deficit shrunk 
to -3.5% in 2009, the government budget deficit has exploded to more than 10% of national 
income, and the net national saving rate has turned highly negative. A smaller trade 
imbalance has been possible only because private investment has fallen to its lowest share 
of GDP since the depression of the 1930s. 
Current expectations are for a weak recovery of the US economy relative to historical norms. 
In Figure 8, we show the paths of recovery, as projected by the CBO and the Obama 
administration in its January 2010 economic reports, and contrast them with the average 
recovery from the eight prior US business cycles. The initial few quarters may incorporate 
sharp cyclical gains in inventory investment, but overall investment is likely to be relatively 
weak for several years due to excess capacity in residential and commercial real estate. The 
administration projects growth at 3% in 2010 and 4.3% in 2011. The CBO is more 
pessimistic, projecting GDP growth of only 2.1% in 2010 and 2.4% in 2011. The IMF report 
projects a similar weak recovery, but it recent projections have been raised upward. In any 
case, these growth rates are far below the pace of recovery from prior recessions. 
                                                  
16 Stephen Cecchetti, Marion Kohler, and Christian Upper (2009) study 28 financial crises since the 1980s and 
argue that the current crisis is unique. They use the variation in their sample (not the averages) to draw 
inferences. Interestingly, they find that external factors (growth in trading partners and number of concurrent 
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The sluggishness of the projected recovery arises from four sources: The first is the 
continuing and only gradually weakening effects of the financial crisis.  Banks and other 
financial institutions, while no longer under threat of financial crisis, have much deleveraging 
still to accomplish—partly to absorb additional large losses and partly to satisfy their own 
heightened risk aversion. The consequence could very well be failure of private credit 
availability to expand sufficiently to sustain vigorous recovery. The second potential source 
of sluggishness is a weak recovery of investment due to the large excess supply in 
residential and commercial real estate. The third is an anticipated drag on consumption 
expansion from the huge losses in net worth suffered by households in recent years. And the 
fourth is a period of several years when budget policy will be tightening as the fiscal stimulus 
is phased out. 
At the same time, the United States must prevent a return to the high-consumption, low-
saving pattern of the precrisis era. Projections of weak income growth and a depreciated 
exchange rate are consistent with the current account remaining at a reduced level of about 
3–4% of GDP; but in the short run, it is likely to be an external balance matched by low or 
even negative rates of national saving and continued low rates of domestic investment. This 
scenario is far from the soft landing that seemed achievable in mid-2008.  
7.1  Fiscal Stimulus Scenarios 
The slow pace of the US recovery has already generated pressures for additional fiscal 
stimulus. However, the imbalances that existed prior to the onset of the crisis—as reflected 
in both the fiscal and external deficits—restrict the policy response to the crisis. Many 
observers have already expressed concern about the ability to finance those deficits in future 
years. Model simulations provide valuable structure for looking more closely at possible 
implications of incremental fiscal stimulus. In this section, we consider simulations using the 
University of Michigan’s quarterly macroeconomic model of the Research Seminar in 
Quantitative Economics (RSQE) to illustrate the short- versus long-term policy conflicts. This 
model is similar to others used to forecast future economic developments and to simulate 
the effects of policy options. 
Table 6 reports the effects of two fiscal policy actions. The first is a permanent increase in 
the constant-dollar value of government purchases. The second assumes that the stimulus 
takes the form of an equal constant-dollar reduction in personal taxes.
17   
 
17 The actual simulation assumed an increase in transfers to persons because it was easier to implement in the 
model. The simulations reflect sustained changes of US$100 billion (2005 prices) per year beginning in the 
fourth quarter of 1998. In nominal terms, the initial expenditure stimulus was US$73 billion, and the tax 
reduction was -US$82 billion.    g Paper 236    Bosworth and Collins 
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  $100 billion (2005 US$) Permanent Increase in Government Purchases 
1 1.53  -0.5    88.2    -51.4    30.0  82.4  52.4    -21.5 
2 2.49  -1.1    175.8    -32.5    -22.1  100.1  122.2    -54.6 
3 2.42  -1.1    232.5    -35.6    -36.2  78.0  114.1    -71.8 
4 1.87  -0.7    271.2    -48.7    -13.1  53.3  66.4    -61.7 
5 1.52  -0.5    306.2    -58.7    18.8  46.1  27.3    -39.9 
                        
  $100 billion (2005 US$) Permanent Reduction in Personal Income Tax 
1 0.61  -0.2    34.7    -74.7    65.8  91.3  25.4    -8.9 
2 1.17  -0.5    78.1    -68.6    45.1  103.1  58.0    -23.5 
3 1.33  -0.6    107.9    -69.7    34.9  96.9  62.0    -34.9 
4 1.21  -0.5    124.7    -75.7    41.7  85.6  43.9    -34.0 
5 1.13  -0.4  136.5  -82.6    57.2 82.1  24.9  -25.4 
Source: Constructed by the authors from policy simulations of the RSQE at the University of Michigan. The two simulations incorporate permanent changes in government purchases and 
transfer payments in constant values. 
Table 6: Simulation of Fiscal Stimulus and National Saving-Investment Balance  
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In order to maximize their impact, we also assumed that monetary policy accommodates the 
fiscal stimulus by maintaining a fixed level of nominal interest rates. Thus, there is no 
monetary offset or fiscal crowding out. Both simulations are reported over a 5-year horizon. 
The simple multipliers for the per-dollar effect on real GDP are reported in the first column. 
As shown, the multiplier on expenditure is particularly large, peaking in the second year with 
a value of 2.5 due to strong effects on private investment, and gradually trailing off 
thereafter. The multiplier for a change in taxes/transfers is significantly smaller, due to the 
partial and lagged response of consumption to the initial increase in disposable income. It 
peaks in the third year at 1.3. The effect on unemployment is correspondingly much larger 
for the purchases simulation than for the tax reduction. The change in the nominal measure 
of national income reflects both the increase in real output and its effect on inflation and the 
price level.  
Our primary interest, however, is how much the government budget balance changes and 
the means by which the change is financed. A portion of any government outlay is recovered 
due to the feedback effects of higher GDP on tax revenues and transfer payments. Thus in 
the first year, a US$75 billion increase in government purchases results in a budget deficit 
increase of US$51 billion. This recovery rate of about one-third rises over time to about 50%. 
A large portion of the budget deficit is initially financed by an offsetting increase in private 
saving. However, the private saving-investment balance also turns negative as private 
consumption responds to the higher income, and as private investment rises in response to 
the growth of GDP. Thus, the fiscal stimulus has a large and growing impact on the trade 
deficit through increased imports that peaks in the third year of the simulation. Because the 
US fiscal action is assumed not to be coordinated with its trading partners, there is no 
equivalent rise in foreign incomes, and the change in US exports is small.
18The impact of 
the tax reduction is substantially smaller than that of the expenditure stimulus. This is 
because the early effect is largely limited to a transfer of funds between the government and 
households, and, at least initially, households save a large portion of the increment to their 
income. Without the expansion of tax revenues, there is a larger decline in the government 
budget, but much of it is offset by the increase in private saving. Again, the current account 
deteriorates, but by a smaller amount in line with the smaller change in GDP. 
The most striking aspect of the simulation is the large portion of the budget deficit that must 
be financed abroad. We conclude that additional fiscal stimulus (unaccompanied by any 
comparable fiscal actions by US trading partners) would speed the recovery from the 
recession and promote job growth, but at the cost of an even larger budget deficit, a large 
deterioration in the trade deficit, and increased reliance on foreign financing. The result is 
financially unsustainable, and no simple means of correcting the future imbalances is 
evident. 
The United States has suffered a major loss of domestic demand—in both consumption and 
investment—the severity of which is being camouflaged by an unsustainable magnitude of 
government deficit spending. The consumption binge of the past two decades is likely to be 
over, and the retrenchment of domestic demand requires a return to a much more balanced 
external position, with near equality of exports and imports. In the long term, the United 
States could achieve a rebalancing of the economy if it were able to increase domestic 
saving. Consumer spending more in line with income and a smaller budget deficit would 
translate into a increase in the domestic S-I balance (which is now highly negative), a real 
exchange depreciation, and a shift of the resources into the tradable goods sector—a 
smaller trade deficit. The challenge is how to get there. A contraction of domestic 
consumption combined with a reduced budget deficit is likely to worsen the current 
recession. A recovery based on further fiscal stimulus (and the associated large internal and 
                                                  
18 In the RSQE model, the nominal exchange rate depreciates, both to offset the higher domestic price level–
effectively maintaining PPP–and in response to the larger current account deficit. As a result, there is very little 
net change in the real exchange rate. 
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external deficits) simply postpones the adjustment. In fact, the demand shortfall may be too 
large to be offset by any feasible fiscal stimulus. Thus, US policymakers confront the 
extremely difficult task of balancing short- and long-term policy objectives.  
7.2  Tools to Achieve Rebalance?  
While it seems obvious that restructuring the economy will require a much greater emphasis 
on the tradable goods industries, the available tools are limited. A sustainable economic 
recovery will require shifting the composition of GDP, consistent with maintaining the share 
of net exports at 3% of GDP or below. However, how to achieve this in the near term is not 
evident. In a fully employed economy, the standard approach would be shifting the mix of 
fiscal-monetary policy: a more restrictive fiscal policy aimed at raising domestic saving, offset 
by monetary policy easing to maintain total demand and encourage exchange rate 
depreciation. However, interest rates are already at historical lows, leaving little room to 
provide stimulus by conventional means. Furthermore, some countries have met the recent 
dollar depreciation with offsetting actions―ranging from direct intervention in exchange 
markets to capital controls―all aimed at preventing the realignment of trade flows.
19 Finally, 
direct restrictions on imports and promotion of exports are severely circumscribed by past 
treaties, with particularly (and deservedly) bad reputations for tariffs and quotas because 
politicians cannot avoid applying them in selective and distortionary ways. What is left? In 
the remainder of this section, we comment briefly on some remaining possibilities.  
The external balance has been a key economic policy target for many countries, but has not 
generally been a focus of US policy.
20 However, President Obama announced a new 
National Export Initiative (NEI) in his January 27, 2010 State of the Union Address to 
Congress, setting the goal of doubling exports in the next five years. The administration 
recognizes the importance of stronger export performance—though it is notable that this 
initiative is explicitly motivated as a means of job creation, not external balance or 
sustainability. Exports, like private saving, are difficult to influence through available policy 
instruments, especially in the short run.
21The administration currently lacks authority to 
negotiate trade agreements, and it seems unlikely that new authority will be granted by 
Congress any time soon. There is little reason to believe that completing the Doha round of 
global trade negotiations would have a significant positive effect on the US trade balance 
(Hufbauer et al. 2010: Box 2).
22 At the same time, barriers into the markets of many US 
trading partners are higher than barriers into the U.S market. Other countries are actively 
negotiating bilateral and regional trade agreements. US exclusion may compound market 
access challenges for US producers. There are also good reasons for concern that the US 
corporate tax structure may reduce the competitiveness of US businesses, with implications 
for location decisions and export performance. A recent study by the US Department of the 
Treasury concluded that although US corporate tax rates were relatively low in the 1980s, 
                                                  
19 Recent examples are new restrictions on inflows that have been introduced by Brazil and Taipei,China; and 
Thailand has relaxed restrictions on capital outflows. Given the required equivalence of the capital and current 
account, it is striking that trade restrictions are universally condemned while proposals for capital controls are 
often embraced.  
20 US trade negotiators have not previously focused on export promotion beyond agriculture. While other 
countries have used tax incentives, financing, and marketing assistance as export-promotion policies, the 
United States has eschewed the use of industrial policies, recognizing that they are distortionary and unlikely 
to be effective within the US political system. For further discussion, see Schultze (1983) and Destler (2005). 
The politics surrounding US trade policy have also been strongly affected by the end of the Cold War, 
removing a major determinant of US trade policy. 
21 The main components of the NEI announced to date include creation of an export promotion cabinet, with a 
private sector advisory group, additional trade finance through the Export-Import Bank (some targeted to small 
and medium-sized businesses), efforts to assist US businesses identify new markets abroad, and reforms to 
the US export control system (to reduce processing time and harmonize standards). 
22 However, completion of the Doha Round would have other positive benefits for the global trading system. 
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the United States had the second highest statutory tax rate among OECD countries in 2006 
due to significant tax reforms abroad (US Department of the Treasury Office of Tax Policy 
2007). Specifically, the US rate was 39% including state corporate taxes, compared with an 
OECD average of just 31%—and a number of other advanced countries are continuing to 
reduce their tax rates. Relatively high business taxes discourage investment by raising the 
cost of capital. The report also highlights concerns related to the distortionary impact of the 
unevenness of US taxation across industries, sectors, and financing methods. This work 
strongly suggests that it is time for a comprehensive reform of the US corporate tax system, 
expanding the base while lowering rates, and that recognizes the major shifts in the global 
landscape. 
Perhaps it is also time for the United States to consider following other countries in the use 
of capital controls intended to force limits on the current account imbalance.
23 In contrast 
with its earlier advocacy of unfettered capital flows, the IMF recently advanced a more 
favorable view of capital controls as a legitimate element in a country’s policy toolkit to help 
limit exchange rate appreciation and reduce the volume of capital inflows (Ostry et al. 2010). 
In terms of effectiveness, they conclude that the jury is still out―the evidence does not point 
clearly to a preferred type of control―and that the efficacy of capital controls is likely to 
diminish over time. They stress the need to consider multilateral implications of such 
measures and that such policies do not substitute for traditional macroeconomic policies and 
prudential regulation. But their conclusion is that such controls may be valuable as 
complements or in situations when traditional means are circumscribed—arguably applicable 
to the current US situation in which capital inflows sustain an undesirably large current 
account imbalance. While their analysis is based on a comprehensive review as well as new 
work on the effects of different types of controls, it focuses on emerging market economies 
(not the central reserve currency’s economy). Capital controls are clearly far from a silver 
bullet, but they may warrant further attention given the paucity of alternative policy options. 
Much of the recent domestic discussion has focused on the PRC’s exchange rate and a 
belief that a PRC exchange rate revaluation would solve US export problems. However, the 
United States and the PRC produce quite different ranges of products. The PRC is a low-
wage producer with a major role in an Asian production network as an assembler of products 
for transshipment to the United States. In contrast, the United States is a high-wage capital 
goods producer whose competitors are largely in Japan and the EU. The benefits of an 
appreciation of the PRC’s currency would accrue mainly to other low-wage countries that 
compete with the PRC. It would benefit the United States by spreading the adjustment to a 
depreciated dollar more broadly—reassuring countries that do allow their currencies to 
appreciate against the dollar that they will not suffer a competitive loss to the PRC. It is true 
that the PRC’s policy of maintaining a large trade surplus at a time of weak global demand 
damages the global economy as a whole, but the associated costs are not borne primarily by 
the United States. A focus on the PRC does not obviate the need for the United States to 
address its own problems. 
The absence of a clear path for the United States to escape the recession and emerge with 
a balanced economy is a cause for great concern. Without a stronger external account, any 
recovery is likely to be incomplete. As the focus of public attention on the trade imbalance 
increases, the pressures for destructive trade actions will grow, and with them the potential 
for trade conflicts. We are led to conclude that the exchange rate is the most important 
determinant for achieving adjustment of the US trade balance. The current level of the real 
exchange rates (perhaps with some further decline) should be consistent with a gradual 
future reduction in the size of the external deficit. The challenge will be to prevent a real 
appreciation.  
                                                  
23 As a member of the OECD, the United States adheres to the codes of liberalization of capital movements, 
which generally prohibit the introduction of new restrictions on capital flows. 
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